Developing Local Currency Bond Markets for Long-term Development Financing in Sub-Saharan Africa by Berensmann, Kathrin et al.
1 
 
 
 
 
Developing local currency bond markets for long-term 
development financing in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
Kathrin Berensmann* 
Florence Dafe** 
Ulrich Volz*** 
 
 
 
This article discusses the role that local currency bond markets (LCBMs) can play in the long-
term financing of sustainable development of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies, and 
presents an empirical analysis of the factors which may hinder or promote the development of 
such markets in SSA. Using a new dataset for 27 SSA countries, our findings support earlier 
research on SSA and other regions, showing that LCBM development is related to country size, 
larger banking systems, greater trade openness and better regulatory frameworks, and the rule of 
law. Foreign investor participation broadens the investor base and can give a boost to LCBM 
development, yet it may also increase volatility of international capital flows. Hence, with a view 
to the experience of emerging economies in other regions, capital market liberalization should be 
pursued only very cautiously and in step with solid financial and institutional development. 
 
Keywords: Local currency bond markets; long-term finance; debt; Sub-Saharan Africa.  
JEL classification: F21, F34, G23, H63, O11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* German Development Institute, e-mail: kathrin.berensmann@die-gdi.de 
** German Development Institute and Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, e-
mail: florence.dafe@die-gdi.de 
*** SOAS, University of London, and German Development Institute, e-mail: uv1@soas.ac.uk  
We are grateful for comments and suggestions received from participants at the IMF/CFD 
Conference on Financing for Development held at the Graduate Institute in Geneva on 15–16 
April 2015. We especially thank our discussant, David Vines, as well as Christopher Adam, 
Andrea Presbitero, and Huang Yi. We also thank Ingo Bordon for excellent comments on an 
earlier version of this paper, as well as two anonymous referees for very helpful 
recommendations.  
2 
 
I. Introduction 
Long-term private financial flows—including foreign direct investment (FDI), cross-border bank 
lending, bond and equity financing, as well as remittances—may assume a crucial role in helping 
attain the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Even though bond financing accounted for 
only 14 per cent of international private capital flows to developing countries in 2012, much 
lower than FDI, which made up about 60 per cent, it was much more important than Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF), which together made up only 
1 per cent total international capital flows to developing countries in the same year (World Bank, 
2013, p. 23).  
To date, local currency bond markets (LCBMs) still play a minor role in the long-term private 
financing of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies, because capital markets are not well 
developed in this region. However, experiences of developing countries in other regions, such as 
Asia, suggest that LCBMs can potentially take on an important role in SSA too in the future. One 
indicator for the nascent stage of bond market development in SSA is the outstanding stock of 
government securities, which accounted for only 14.8 per cent of GDP in 2010 on average, being 
significantly lower than in other developing, emerging, and advanced economies. A further 
indicator of the shallowness of the LCBMs in SSA is that government securities issues 
significantly exceed corporate bond issues. Government securities made up nearly 90 per cent of 
total outstanding local currency denominated bonds in 2010. Compared to other regions of the 
world, the difference between these two types of securities is much larger in SSA (IMF, 2013, p. 
40; Mu et al., 2013). 
The development of LCBMs can contribute to mobilizing long-term domestic financial resources 
for achieving the SDGs, in particular for much-needed local or regional infrastructure 
investments. One main prerequisite for LCBMs meeting this goal is that capital markets as well 
as banks are able to assume their transformation role of converting relatively short-term deposits 
into long-term investments in infrastructure (World Bank, 2013, p. 24). By means of issuing 
infrastructure project bonds, capital is generated for specific projects.1 Kenya, for example, has 
successfully issued infrastructure bonds since 2009, raising money for water, road, and energy 
projects. The issuance of these government bonds has made it easier to issue corporate bonds of 
private or state-owned enterprises (IMF, 2014, p. 48). 
                                                           
1
 See, for instance, Mbeng Mezui (2012). 
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Even though the significance of LCBMs in SSA for long-term investments is currently limited 
compared to alternative sources of long-term financing, LCBMs represent a promising 
instrument to provide long-term financing in the future. There may be various benefits in 
developing LCBMs in SSA. One main advantage is that LCBMs can contribute to improving 
capital allocation by offering alternative sources of financing and by diversifying risks among 
different groups of investors, both domestic and foreign. Another advantage is that domestic debt 
markets may contribute to a better financial intermediation and promote domestic investments. 
Moreover, LCBMs may alleviate the effects of debt and financial crises as well as other external 
shocks on the domestic economy. By reducing the dependency on foreign debt, LCBMs can also 
alleviate the ‘original sin’ problem and thereby reduce the risk of currency mismatches 
(Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; Khan, 2005; IMF, 2007, p. 55, and 2013, p. 39; Adelegan 
and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009, p. 3; Berensmann, 2010; Maziad et al., 2013, pp. 5–7; Essers et al., 
2015, pp. 6–7). Moreover, as pointed out by Arnone and Presbitero (2010), building the 
institutional infrastructure for the issuance of domestic public debt can support the organization 
and functioning of local financial markets at large. 
Against this backdrop, this article examines the factors which may impede and promote LCBM 
development in SSA. Our analysis focuses on sovereign debt, not only because this makes up the 
lion’s share of LCBMs in SSA, but also because liquid local currency sovereign debt markets are 
considered a prerequisite for the development of vibrant local currency corporate bond markets 
(e.g. Dittmar and Yuan, 2008). The next section briefly presents recent trends and challenges of 
LCBM development in SSA. Subsequently, section III econometrically analyses patterns of 
LCBM development in SSA. Section IV highlights some experiences with bond market 
development from emerging markets in Asia and Latin America and discusses possible lessons 
for countries in SSA. Section V concludes with policy recommendations. 
 
II. Recent trends in and challenges for LCBM development in SSA 
A key development over the past decade has been the increasing reliance of governments in SSA 
on markets for debt financing. As Figure 1 shows, governments in SSA have increasingly used 
marketable debt, comprising bonds, notes, and money market instruments, as opposed to non-
marketable debt, which consists mainly of loans by official bilateral or multilateral creditors, 
such as the World Bank, and loans by commercial banks. There was a slight decrease in reliance 
on markets for debt financing in 2008 and 2009, possibly in response to actual or expected 
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difficulties in raising funds through markets in the wake of the global financial crisis. Yet, 
overall, there is a positive trend in the share of marketable debt to total debt. 
 
Figure 1: Central government marketable debt (% of total central government debt) in SSA 
 
Note: Figure includes Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. No 
data are available for Angola from 2010 onwards, for Gabon from 2003 to 2006 and from 2010 
onwards, and for Namibia from 2008 onwards. 
Source: OECD (2013). 
 
The regional aggregates disguise considerable variation in the role debt financing through 
markets plays for different SSA countries. For instance, while between 2008 and 2012 the 
average ratio of marketable debt to total debt amounts to 100 per cent in Tanzania, 96 per cent in 
South Africa, and 86 per cent in Nigeria and Mauritius, this share amounts to only 51 per cent in 
Kenya, 40 per cent in Uganda, 20 per cent in Sierra Leone and Madagascar, 17 per cent in 
Cameroon, and 8 per cent in Mozambique. Table 1 presents these cross-national differences for a 
selection of countries in SSA for which data are available, for the period before and after the 
global financial crisis. It is remarkable that the average ratios of marketable debt to total debt 
increased compared to the pre-crisis period, notably in the categories of low-income and lower 
middle-income countries, as classified by the World Bank. This suggests that the overall positive 
trend in the use of markets for debt financing in SSA shown in Figure 1 has not been driven by 
individual or upper middle-income countries. 
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Table 1: Central government marketable debt (% of total central government debt) in selected 
SSA countries 
Note: a Data for Angola in the time period 2008–12 are only available for 2009. 
Source: OECD (2013).  
 
 
Another trend is that marketable debt is increasingly issued in local currency. Specifically, there 
has been a slight increase in the ratio of local currency marketable debt to total marketable debt 
between 2003 and 2012, with a dip in the crisis year 2009 (Figure 2). 
 
 2003–7 2008–12 2012 
Low-income countries    
Kenya 44.0 51.3 52.9 
Madagascar 15.8 20.7 18.1 
Malawi 30.0 52.1 34.0 
Mozambique 4.7 9.0 11.2 
Sierra Leone 12.6 20.1 20.6 
Tanzania 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Uganda 23.4 39.8 40.4 
Average low-income countries 32.9 41.9 39.6 
Lower middle-income countries    
Cameroon 8.3 17.3 21.7 
Nigeria 49.0 85.9 87.6 
Zambia 30.0 53.9 46.0 
Average lower middle-income 
countries 29.1 52.3 51.8 
Upper middle-income countries    
Angolaa 18.8 49.1  
Mauritius 100.0 86.3 81.0 
South Africa 95.7 95.5 96.3 
Average upper middle-income 
countries 71.5 77.0 88.6 
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Figure 2: Local currency central government marketable debt (% of central government 
marketable debt) in SSA 
 
Note: Figure includes Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. No 
data are available for Angola from 2010 onwards, for Gabon from 2003 to 2007 and from 2010 
onwards, and for Namibia from 2008 onwards. 
Source: Compiled with data from OECD (2013).  
 
 
If we turn to local currency treasury bond market development, the picture that emerges is more 
ambiguous. At present, the database of the African Development Bank’s African Financial 
Market Initiative (AFMI) seems to have the largest coverage of local currency treasury bonds, in 
terms of both countries and years. Since there remain significant gaps in the dataset for many 
SSA countries up to the year 2006, in the following analysis we focus on developments within 
the years 2007 to 2012. As Figure 3 shows, local currency treasury bond issuance as share of 
GDP in SSA increased from 2007 onwards and decreased after 2010. The regional aggregate 
disguises significant differences in the amounts of local currency sovereign bonds issued 
between SSA countries in different income groups. While local currency treasury bonds issued 
in the period 2010–12 on average amounted to 8.6 per cent and 7.1 per cent of GDP in Mauritius 
and Ghana, respectively, it was virtually zero in Benin (Table 2). However, there has been an 
increase in the average size of local currency treasury bonds in all three groups of countries, low-
income, lower middle-income, and upper middle income countries, from the first period (2007–
9) to the second period (2010–12). In addition, the data suggest that low-income countries issue 
on average a smaller amount of bonds as share of GDP than do middle-income countries. As 
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
7 
 
Table 2 shows, between 2010 and 2012, the average debt issued in low-income countries was 
almost 2 per cent of GDP, whereas in lower middle-income and upper middle-income countries 
the average debt issued amounted to more than 3 per cent of GDP. That said, the amounts issued 
by low-income African countries in recent years are not negligible. In 2012, for instance, the 
total amount of local currency bonds issued in our sample of low-income countries amounts to 
2.5 per cent of GDP of these countries.2 This is equivalent to 28 per cent of net ODA received by 
these countries, or 34 per cent of their net inflows of FDI in 2012. 
 
Figure 3: Local currency treasury bonds issued (% of GDP) in SSA 
 
Note: Figure includes Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Data for Benin for 2010 are missing. Data for Botswana 
are included from 2008 onwards. Data for Burkina Faso for 2008 are missing. Data for Mali and 
for Mozambique are included from 2008 onwards.  
Source: Compiled with data from African Development Bank (AfDB, 2014).  
 
 
  
                                                           
2
 In 2012, Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda are included in our sample 
of low-income countries. 
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Table 2: Local currency treasury bonds issued (% of GDP) 
Source: AfDB (2014).  
 
To what extent have LCBMs in SSA deepened in recent years? Using the ratio of local currency 
treasury bonds outstanding to GDP as a measure of the depth of the local currency treasury bond 
market, Figure 4 shows that in SSA as a whole LCBMs have deepened between 2007 and 2012. 
That said, the amount of local currency treasury bonds outstanding has slightly declined between 
2010 and 2012. Table 3 presents averages of local currency bonds outstanding by income group 
and a comparison of these averages in the time period 2007–9 and the time period 2010–12. The 
data presented in Table 3 show that LCBMs have, on average, deepened in the recent time 
period, a finding that holds for the group of low-income, lower middle-income and upper 
middle-income countries. In addition, the data indicate a positive relationship between the level 
 Average 2007–9 Average 2010–
12 
2012 
Low-income countries    
Benin 1.3 0.0 0.0 
Burkina Faso 1.7 0.9 0.6 
Kenya 3.8 5.7 5.0 
Mali 0.7 0.3 0.0 
Mozambique 0.1 0.7 0.8 
Tanzania 1.2 1.9 1.9 
Togo 0.6 2.3 2.4 
Uganda 2.3 2.9 2.8 
Average low-income countries 1.4 1.8 1.7 
Lower middle-income countries    
Cabo Verde 3.3 4.7 4. 7 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.9 2.5 2.0 
Ghana 4.0 7.1 7.7 
Nigeria 2.6 1.5 1.2 
Senegal 1.0 2.3 3.5 
Zambia 1.6 1.8 1.7 
Average lower middle-income 
countries 2.2 3.3 3.5 
Upper middle-income countries    
Angola 1.2 0.9 0.8 
Botswana 1.5 1.2 0.5 
Gabon 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Mauritius 7.5 8.6 9.3 
Namibia 0.8 2.0 2.2 
South Africa 5.0 6.4 5.4 
Average upper middle-income 
countries 2.7 3.2 3.0 
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of economic development and LCBM depth: in both time periods under consideration, the 
relative size of LCBMs is smallest in low-income countries and largest in upper middle-income 
countries. 
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Table 3: Local currency treasury bonds outstanding (% of GDP) 
Source: AfDB (2014).  
 
 Average 2007–
9 
Average 2010–
12 
Average 2012 
Low-income countries    
Benin 2.5 2.7 2.2 
Burkina Faso 2.2 3.8 4.0 
Kenya 10.5 21.8 22.7 
Malawi 0.8 0.2 0.1 
Mali 1.0 1.6 1.2 
Mozambique 2.2 2.4 2.6 
Tanzania 4.2 5.7 6.4 
Togo 3.2 5.3 7.5 
Uganda 6.8 7.4 7.5 
Average low-income countries 3.7 5.7 6.0 
Lower middle-income countries    
Cabo Verde 17.0 22.0 23.2 
Côte d’Ivoire 2.9 6.3 8.2 
Ghana 9.4 13.4 15.3 
Nigeria 7.1 5.7 5.8 
Senegal 2.8 5.7 7.6 
Zambia 5.3 5.6 6.1 
Average lower middle-income 
countries 7.4 9.8 11.0 
Upper middle-income countries    
Angola 1.5 4.3 4.3 
Botswana 3.7 5.1 5.2 
Gabon 1.2 0.3 0.2 
Mauritius 27.2 34.9 35.8 
Namibia 10.1 9.3 9.3 
South Africa 25.8 32.1 33.1 
Average upper middle-income 
countries 11.6 14.3 14.6 
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Figure 4: Local currency treasury bonds outstanding (% of GDP) in SSA 
 
Note: Figure includes Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Data for Mali are included from 2008 onwards. 
Source: Compiled with data from AfDB (2014).  
 
 
The maturity profile presents another important indicator for LCBM development (Bua et al., 
2014). Short maturities enhance rollover risks and contribute to macroeconomic vulnerability. 
Yet governments may prefer to issue short-term debt if the yield curve is strongly upward-
sloping, since borrowing costs increase significantly with longer tenors. Generally speaking, 
LCBMs in SSA are still shallow, especially for longer-dated maturities, but several 
governments—including South Africa, Botswana, and Nigeria—have been able to issue longer-
term debt. The average maturity of bonds differs significantly among SSA countries, as depicted 
in Figure 5. It is notable that in Ghana, where the local currency treasury bond market has 
deepened significantly over recent years, the average tenure of these bonds is still one of the 
shortest across the region. This shows that confidence in Ghanaian local currency government 
bonds is still limited.  
Short maturities of government securities represent a major structural challenge for LCBM 
development in SSA. If governments issue only short-term papers, this obstructs the 
development of secondary markets, since investors are likely to hold their papers to maturity. 
Moreover, along with an insufficient issuance of government securities, it will prevent the 
emergence of a yield curve for government securities which can be used to price cash-flows off 
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the curve. A liquid yield curve is generally seen as important for price discovery in the bond 
market. The lack of a secondary market and a yield curve for sovereign bonds inhibits the 
development of corporate bond markets, since government bonds cannot assume their 
benchmarking role (Dittmar and Yuan, 2008). And of course, undeveloped domestic debt 
markets increase rollover risks, generate higher interest rates, and reduce the effectiveness of 
monetary policy (IMF, 2013, p. 40). 
 
Figure 5: Average tenure of local currency treasury bonds issued (years), 2013 
 
Source: Compiled with data from African Financial Markets Database. 
 
The cost of bond borrowing measured by the average yield also differs substantially across SSA 
economies, as shown in Figure 6. The yield is an important indicator for LCBM development 
because it reflects risk perceptions and confidence in the market. Bua et al. (2014, p. 11) find 
that in low-income countries the cost of domestic public debt and the share of long-term 
instruments is negatively correlated, suggesting that ‘debt portfolios of longer maturity face 
lower cost than debt portfolios of shorter maturity’. This can be observed in SSA, too. While the 
South African government, for instance, benefits from comparatively lower yields and longer 
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maturities, a country like Ghana, conversely, faces high and volatile yields even for relatively 
short maturities. 
 
Figure 6: Average issue yield of local currency treasury bonds (in %), 2013 
 
Source: Compiled with data from African Financial Markets Database. 
 
Lastly, the ownership of local-currency marketable debt represents an additional guide for the 
developmental stage of LCBMs. Since only few countries in SSA have a centralized information 
system with comprehensive historical trade data, databases of bond holders from national 
sources are often patchy, and flow of funds data are usually not available for most SSA 
economies. Table 4 provides information on ownership of local-currency marketable debt, with a 
distinction between resident and non-resident bond holders. Although the data shown in the table 
are incomplete, the situation is that—with the notable exception of South Africa—local-currency 
marketable debt in SSA is predominantly or even exclusively held by domestic investors. 
Meanwhile, South Africa, the most developed market in the region, has seen a decline in the 
share of local-currency marketable debt held by residents from 95 per cent in 2004 to 62 per cent 
in 2013, mirroring the increasing confidence of foreign investors in the South African LCBM. 
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By contrast, in Kenya the share of local-currency marketable debt held by residents remained 
high, with 97 per cent in 2003 and 99 per cent in 2013. 
The domestic investor base is generally narrow and highly concentrated (Arnone and Presbitero, 
2010). In most SSA countries, local-currency marketable debt is predominantly held by domestic 
commercial banks. Exceptions are Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, 
and Zambia, where domestic institutional funds (and in some cases also the central bank) hold 
significant portions of local-currency marketable debt. South Africa is again a special case, given 
that only 23 per cent of resident ownership of local-currency marketable debt was with domestic 
commercial banks in 2013, while 77 per cent of all resident holdings was with domestic 
institutional funds. 
 
A restricted and undifferentiated investor base in domestic debt markets which is largely 
concentrated on commercial banks is a serious structural challenge. A narrow investor base 
exists although auctions of government debt have been oversubscribed in many countries, 
including those of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (IMF, 2015, p. 7). As 
pointed out by Sy (2007), there are various reasons why local commercial banks in SSA 
typically have a big appetite for government securities. With high yields even at relatively short 
maturities, banks have a strong incentive to invest in (supposedly) safe government securities 
rather than private-sector projects. Moreover, in most SSA countries interest earned on 
government bonds is tax exempt, while sovereign bonds carry a zero risk weight in the 
calculation of capital adequacy ratios. While this improves the funding situation of the 
government, the drawback, however, is a possible crowding out effect, i.e. when commercial 
banks allocate a large share of their assets to sovereign debt, private saving may be used for 
government financing rather than private investment (Bua et al., 2014). Abbas and Christensen 
(2010) have shown that the growth effect of domestic public debt is higher for marketable 
instruments that are held by non-bank investors. A more diversified ownership is crucial to 
eliminating the crowding-out effect. Moreover, a more differentiated investor base can reduce 
financial vulnerability since a large exposure of domestic banks to their home governments’ debt 
can cause ‘disruptive self-reinforcing feedback loops’ (Gros, 2013, p. 93) when either the banks 
or the sovereign encounter problems. Last but not least, a narrow investor base also hinders the 
development of secondary markets. 
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Table 4: Ownership of local-currency marketable debt (amounts outstanding at the end of 
period, million euro) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Angola  627 1,121 1,518 1,864 2,735 9,855 6,506 5,431 5,822 6,645 
  Resident 627 1,221 1,518 1,841 2,735 9,855 6,506 5,431 5,822 6,645 
  Non-resident 23 0.06 
Cameroon  814 401 383 295 262 249 248 520 692 698 1,153 
  Resident 814 401 383 295 262 249 248 456 628 654 1,121 
  Non-resident 64 64 44 32 
Gabon  104 83 
  Resident 42 34 
  Non-resident 61 49 
Kenya 3,010 2,889 3,660 3,875 4,295 3,929 4,753 6,134 5,869 8,105 9,347 
  Resident 2,915 2,851 3,584 3,820 4,284 3,903 4,729 6,105 5,809 8,001 9,262 
  Non-resident 96 38 75 55 12 26 24 29 60 104 85 
Madagascar  714 396 411 437 461 371 378 417 453 510 476 
  Resident 714 396 411 437 461 371 378 417 453 510 476 
  Non-resident 
Malawi  376 418 492 363 446 737 833 765 955 466 663 
  Resident 376 418 492 363 446 737 833 765 955 466 663 
  Non-resident 
Mauritius  2,741 2,492 2,699 2,160 2,559 2,355 2,745 3,052 3,426 3,391 3,518 
  Resident 2,348 2,739 3,049 3,419 3,385 3,509 
  Non-resident 7 6 3 7 6 10 
Mozambique  160 102 193 156 139 120 103 428 637 685 794 
  Resident 685 794 
  Non-resident 
Namibia 
  Resident 
  Non-resident 
Nigeria 7,696 7,652 9,995 10,472 12,622 12,644 15,177 22,789 27,737 31,824 33,204 
  Resident 7,696 7,652 9,995 10,472 12,622 12,644 15,177 22789 27,737 31,824 33,204 
  Non-resident 
Sierra Leone 100 112 146 147 145 173 170 156 165 219 370 
  Resident 100 112 146 147 145 173 170 156 165 219 370 
  Non-resident 
South Africa 45,229 47,528 53,795 41,837 33,499 34,127 51,554 70,430 79,978 81,978 
  Resident 42,887 44,922 50,164 38,538 30,153 29,856 43,808 54,348 56,569 50,816 
  Non-resident 2,342 2606 3631 3300 3346 4271 7746 16,083 23,382 31,163 
Tanzania 954 1,029 1,748 1,488 1,855 1,387 1,164 1,714 1,674 2,222 
  Resident 954 1,029 1,748 1,488 1,855 1,387 1,164 1,714 1,674 2,222 
  Non-resident 
Uganda  498 580 801 830 1,117 990 971 1,568 1,359 1,801 2,162 
  Resident 498 580 801 830 1,117 990 971 1,568 1,359 1,801 1,959 
  Non-resident 203 
Zambia  775 680 1,286 1,154 1,360 1,169 1,429 1,558 1,992 2,108 2,547 
  Resident 775 680 1,286 1,154 1,360 1,169 1,429 1,558 1,992 2,108 2,547 
  Non-resident 
Note: Blank spaces mean that data are not available. 
Source: Compiled with data from OECD (2015). 
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The literature on bond market development has identified several other structural challenges in 
building up LCBMs which also appear to have a significant impact on the development of 
LCBMs in SSA. Several factors impede the issuance and monitoring of domestic debt, including 
a lack of an efficient institutional structure and a solid legal framework. Similarly, a lack of 
personnel trained in debt management, crucial for the issuance of domestic securities, contributes 
to the slow development of LCBMs in this region. A further problem is that government bonds 
could crowd out corporate bonds (IMF, 2007, pp. 64–5, and 2014, p. 40; Arnone and Presbitero, 
2010). The slow pace of LCBM development in SSA is also related to the fact that often real 
interest costs of domestic issuance at longer maturities significantly exceed foreign borrowing 
costs, mainly because there is little trust in the markets due to high expected inflation rates and a 
lack of secondary market liquidity (IMF et al., 2013). Furthermore, there may be additional risks 
for investments in sustainable development owing to a lack of information and of internalization 
of environmental and social costs (Waygood, 2014). 
The picture that emerges from this discussion of recent trends in the development of sovereign 
bond markets in SSA is that LCBMs are, indeed, at a nascent stage but have seen significant 
development progress over the past decade. This suggests that it is the right time to learn and 
think about ways to spur the continued development of these markets but also about potential 
risks of LCBM development. In following section, we focus on the first issue and examine 
empirically the factors which may hinder and promote the development of LCMBs. 
 
III. Patterns of LCBM development in Sub-Saharan Africa: cross-country econometric 
evidence 
What needs to be done to render LCBMs a reliable and major source of long-term financing for 
sustainable development in SSA? This section approaches the question empirically by examining 
the factors that influence LCBM development. Our aim is to explore what variables have been 
associated with LCBM development in SSA and whether the correlates of LCBM development 
in SSA are different from elsewhere. Specifically, we employ cross-country econometric 
analysis to examine the broad patterns of LCBM development in SSA and learn about potential 
key drivers and obstacles. Our focus is on the relationship between a broad set of 
macroeconomic and institutional variables on the one hand and LCBM development on the 
other. 
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There is little empirical research on the drivers of bond market development in SSA to date, and 
empirical scholarship on local currency bond market development in SSA is even more scant.3 
One major reason for this is probably the historical predominance of external borrowing, and 
hence of foreign rather than local currency debt in low-income countries (Bua et al., 2014). 
Another reason is most certainly the poor quality and availability of data on debt in SSA. The 
data situation has only improved very recently, opening up opportunities for empirical research 
on the patterns of bond market development in SSA. Bua et al. (2014), for instance, introduce a 
new dataset on domestic debt in low-income countries which covers 40 countries, of which 29 
are in SSA, in the period 1971–2011 and provides cross-country comparable data both on the 
stock of domestic debt and its structure, including detailed information on maturity, currency 
composition, creditor base, and the type of instruments. In the dataset constructed by Bua et al. 
(2014), however, domestic debt refers primarily to debt owed to residents, rather than to debt 
denominated in local currency, which is the focus of our paper. In another recent study, Essers et 
al. (2015) use data on local currency debt in SSA from the OECD’s African Central Government 
Debt Statistical Yearbook (OECD, 2013) to examine the drivers of LCBM development. Yet 
their sample remains limited to 15 African countries and the time period 2003–12 because data 
for their dependent variable, year-end outstanding marketable central government debt in or 
indexed to local currency as a percentage of GDP, are only available for relatively few African 
countries and years.  
Drawing from the African Development Bank’s AFMI database, among others, we compile a 
dataset comprising 27 SSA countries, ranging over a maximum of 14 years, namely the period 
2000–13. For sure, our sample size remains limited as well, weakening the power of statistical 
tests, and the time span of data on the stock of local currency bonds differs across countries in 
our dataset. Overall, however, we are confident that our analysis, which is based on a 
comparatively large dataset, will help to generate novel and more robust insights in LCBM 
development in SSA and the question of whether patterns in LCBM development in SSA are 
different from patterns elsewhere. 
 
  
                                                           
3
 For previous studies on the determinants of bond market development in SSA see Mu et al. (2013) and Adelegan 
and Radzewicz-Bak (2009). For a recent paper on the drivers of local currency bond market development see Essers 
et al. (2015). 
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(i) Model specification  
Following existing studies on the determinants of LCBM development such as Essers et al. 
(2015) and Mu et al. (2013), we employ a model of the following form: 
Yi,t = α + βXi,t–1+ δµi +εi,t 
where Yi,t is the dependent variable, i.e. the outstanding amount of local currency treasury bonds 
as a percentage of GDP for country i in year t; this variable is our indicator for the depth of 
LCBMs; Xi,t–1 is a vector of 1-year lagged explanatory variables derived from the literature and 
described below; µi are country-specific effects and εi,t is an error term. While it is not possible to 
establish causal relationships with the data and models we use, we seek at a minimum to ensure 
that changes in the explanatory variable precede changes in the dependent variable by using lags 
of the explanatory variables. 
Our main interest is to explore the variation of LCBM development across countries in SSA, 
rather than the variation within countries over time with models using country fixed effects (FE). 
The reasons for the focus on cross-country variation are threefold. First, comparing the overall, 
between, and within variation in Appendix Table A2 suggests that for our dependent and most 
explanatory variables, most variation arises from differences between countries rather than from 
changes within countries over time. This predominance of cross-country variation would render 
it difficult to discover significant relationships with fixed-effects models, which examine 
variation within countries over time. Second, our time series for LCBM development is 
relatively short, covering at a maximum 14 years and with the availability of data on LCBM 
development being limited for several countries before 2004.4 Finally, we focus on examining 
cross-country rather than within-country variation to allow for the comparison with other studies 
on the determinants of local currency bond market development such as Claessens et al. (2007), 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), and Eichengreen et al. (2008), each of which 
focuses on the cross-country dimension of variation in LCBM development.  
Specifically, we employ two different estimators. First, as our baseline model, we employ pooled 
ordinary least squares (POLS) with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to address panel 
heteroscedasticity; this model assumes a common intercept across countries (δ = 0). Second, as 
our main model, we employ the random effects (RE) model with heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors and a correction for autocorrelation, following other studies such as Eichengreen 
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 Specifically, data on local currency bond market development for the period from 2000 to 2003 is only available 
for half of the countries in our sample. 
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and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Eichengreen et al. (2008); this estimator models the country-
specific constant terms µi as distributed randomly across countries and as independent from the 
other explanatory variables.5  
 
(ii) LCBM development—the dependent variable 
We complement the existing literature by using data on local currency marketable central 
government bonds from the African Development Bank’s AFMI. The AFMI data are available 
for a larger set of SSA countries than the set of countries included in the analysis by Essers et al. 
(2015),6 allowing us to gain insights on the correlates of LCBM development based on a 
different and larger set of countries. Our analysis is also different from other studies in that we 
focus on treasury bonds of a maturity of 1 year or greater. While for instance Essers et al. (2015) 
include short-term government securities with a maturity of less than 1 year in their analysis, we 
exclude them because short-term securities may be less appropriate instruments to finance the 
long-term investments needed to achieve the SDGs. 
To measure the depth of LCBMs we use a variable capturing the total amount of medium- and 
long-term (maturity of 1 year or more) sovereign bonds in local currency outstanding as 
percentage of GDP (Bonds to GDP). The data on the total amount of bonds outstanding are from 
the AFMI database, the GDP data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the 
World Bank (2014). 
 
  
                                                           
5
 With a view to facilitating the comparison with other studies and as additional robustness checks we used three 
additional estimators, the results of which are presented in the online appendix and are not discussed here in detail. 
First, we used a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) which accounts for heteroscedastic error structures and 
panel-specific autocorrelation. Second, we used an FE model, which employs heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors and country and period FEs; an AR1 error model, which employs panel-corrected standard errors, country FE, 
and a Prais-Winston transformation to address the serial correlation of errors that was suggested by the Wooldridge 
test for serial correlation. Prais-Winston regressions involve a transformation of the data based on an estimate of the 
autocorrelation of the error terms. Country FE serve to capture country-specific constant factors, which, if not 
included in the model, would give rise to omitted variable bias. Yet eliminating time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries comes at the cost of less efficient estimates. Specifically, it is not possible to 
examine the effects of time-invariant explanatory variables such as the legal origin and the cross-country dimension 
of variation in the explanatory variable more generally. 
6
 Table A1 in the on-line appendix provides an overview over the African countries included in our sample and the 
sample of countries in some selected studies. 
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(iii) Explanatory variables 
In selecting the explanatory variables of the analysis, we follow various studies that examine the 
drivers of bond market development in Africa and elsewhere, allowing us to draw conclusions on 
whether the determinants of LCBM development in SSA are the same as elsewhere. The first 
group of explanatory variables relates to economic structure. There is some evidence for a 
positive relationship between country size and bond market development from studies which 
focus on regions other than Africa.7 One possible reason is that smaller-sized economies face 
greater obstacles to bond market development because economies of scale, which are important 
to reduce the costs of the establishment of LCBMs, are more difficult to realize (Claessens et al., 
2007, p. 379). Another possible reason for a positive relationship between country size and bond 
market development is that larger economies offer greater diversification benefits to foreign 
investors (Hausmann and Panizza, 2003). The greater availability of (potential) buyers and 
sellers in larger-sized economies may also enhance bond market development by reducing price 
volatility (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004). We use the natural log of GDP in 
constant 2005 United States dollars (USD) (ln GDP) to capture the size of an economy. Data are 
from the WDI database. 
The discussion of recent trends in LCBM development in the previous section suggests that there 
is a positive relationship between LCBM development and the stage of economic development, a 
finding that is in line with some studies on the determinants of financial market development 
more generally.8 We use the natural log of the GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD (ln GDP 
per capita) as an indicator of the level of economic development. The data are from the WDI. 
Following Essers et al. (2015) and Mu et al. (2013), we also include a measure for trade 
openness. Trade openness may be positively correlated with financial development for several 
reasons. One reason may be that trade openness supports bond market development indirectly by 
encouraging an economic dynamic and institutional development in ways not completely 
captured by other variables (Eichengreen et al., 2008, p. 265). Another reason may be that 
established industrial interests may be less opposed to financial development despite 
encouraging market entry and benefiting newcomers when an economy allows cross-border trade 
flows (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).9 Yet a negative correlation is also plausible as countries which 
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 See for instance Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Claessens et al. (2007) 
8
 See for instance Calderón and Liu (2003), who find a bi-directional relationship between finance and growth. 
9
 Specifically, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that incumbents’ opposition to financial development, which 
encourages competition, will be weaker when an economy allows both cross-border trade and capital flows. 
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are less integrated into world markets may have more incentive to develop domestic bond market 
markets in order to meet their financing needs (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009). We use 
WDI data on the total exports of goods and services as a share of GDP (trade to GDP) as an 
indicator for trade openness. 
The size of the banking sector may also affect LCBM development. As banks play an important 
role in the development of liquid and functioning bond markets as dealers and market-makers, a 
more developed banking sector may be positively associated with bond market development 
(Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004, p. 13). In addition, in most SSA countries banks are 
the major class of government bond investors, suggesting a well-developed banking sector may 
enhance bond market development. However, a larger banking sector may also be associated 
with lower bond market development as powerful banks may oppose bond market development 
which breeds competition (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009) or as banks may substitute for 
bond financing. To probe the relationship between banking sector development and bond market 
development we employ as an indicator for the size of the banking sector private credit by banks 
as share of GDP (private credit to GDP), again taken from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
In addition, we include in some specifications a variable capturing the sum of rents from oil, 
minerals, and gas as a share of GDP (resource rents to GDP) from the WDI.10 We include this 
structural economic variable because there is some evidence that resource dependence influences 
financial sector development (Beck, 2011), and resource dependence is quite prevalent in the 
African context. As regards LCBM development, the direction of the expected relationship is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, windfall gains from the extraction of natural resources may reduce 
the government’s demand for financing and hence the incentives for LCBM development. On 
the other hand, large natural resource revenues increase the creditworthiness of the government 
which may encourage LCBM development. We include resource rents to GDP only in some of 
our baseline models because the availability of data for this variable is limited. 
The second group of explanatory variables captures macroeconomic policy choices. One of these 
variables is the fiscal balance, defined as revenues minus expenditure. There is some evidence 
for a negative relationship between the fiscal balance and bond market development (Mu et al., 
2013; Essers et al., 2015). Yet a priori, the effect of the fiscal balance on bond market 
development is ambiguous: the government’s financing needs may provide an important impetus 
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 Rents are defined in this study as the difference between the price of a commodity and the average cost of 
producing it. 
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for LCBM development (Maziad et al., 2013). More negative fiscal balances (that is, larger 
fiscal deficits) may thus be positively associated with LCBM development. Yet large fiscal 
deficits may also raise doubts about macroeconomic stability and the government’s ability to 
repay debt among potential investors and may thus have a negative influence on sovereign bond 
market development. Moreover, it is plausible to assume in the African context that the fiscal 
balance is endogenous to bond market development, as the ability to run fiscal deficits is likely 
to be constrained by bond market development (Essers et al., 2015). We follow other scholars 
such as Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009), and 
Essers et al. (2015) in using the 3-year moving average of past budget balances as a share of 
GDP (fiscal balance to GDP) to reduce the effects of cyclical fluctuations. Data are, again, from 
the WDI database.  
There is considerable empirical evidence that high inflation rates, indicating low monetary policy 
credibility and thus the likelihood that creditors’ interest rate earnings might be eroded by 
inflation, are an obstacle to LCBM development (Hausmann and Panizza, 2003; Claessens et al., 
2007; Essers et al., 2015). Moreover, in countries with a history of high inflation, governments 
are likely to face pressure to offer higher coupon rates on fixed-rate bonds ex ante, which could 
result in higher real interest costs if the expected inflation does not materialize ex post, rendering 
the issuance of such bonds less attractive to governments in the first place (Essers et al., 2015). 
We include WDI data on the inflation rate as measured by the annual change in the consumer 
price index as an explanatory variable and—admittedly imperfect—proxy of monetary policy 
credibility. 
We also include capital account openness as an explanatory variable. Ex ante, the effect is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, an open capital account may help promote bond market 
development, for instance by encouraging foreign investors to enter the market. Claessens et al. 
(2007, p. 389) argue that an open capital account also raises the interest of domestic investors in 
bonds by exposing countries to greater market discipline. On the other hand, capital controls may 
prevent domestic capital from leaving the country and thus create a captive investor base 
(Forslund et al., 2011). We follow existing research, such as Essers et al. (2015), in using the 
Chinn–Ito Financial Openness Index (Ito and Chinn, 2014), a de jure measure of capital account 
openness.11 Higher values of the index indicate a more open capital account. 
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 For information on how the index is constructed see Ito and Chinn (2008). 
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In addition we include the variable exchange rate volatility. Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 
(2004), for instance, find that lower exchange rate volatility is positively correlated with bond 
market development. The reason may be that exchange rate stability can provide credibility and 
may lower currency risk which may in turn encourage foreign participation and lead to greater 
domestic currency intermediation (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004; Claessens et al., 
2007). However, a priori a positive relationship between exchange rate volatility and LCBM 
development seems also plausible as stable exchange rates may increase the incentives to issue 
debt in foreign, rather than local currency. We measure exchange rate volatility by the 5-year 
rolling standard deviation of the change of the log of exchange rates. Data are from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. 
As a final economic policy variable we include foreign exchange reserves, which are measured 
as a share of GDP. Ex ante, its relationship with LCBM development is ambiguous. The 
relationship may be positive because large foreign reserves provide an indication that the country 
is not prone to currency crisis, reassuring potential investors. It may, however, also be negative 
because countries with large foreign exchange reserves tend have current account surpluses, 
which means that they are building up net asset positions abroad. Since exported savings are not 
invested domestically, they are not invested in LCBMs. Data on foreign exchange reserves are 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
The third group of explanatory variables we consider refers to the quality of institutions. We 
include a variable capturing the legal origin because there is some evidence that in countries 
whose legal rules originate in the British common law tradition as opposed to the civil law 
tradition financial markets are more developed, arguably because legal rules originating in the 
British common law tradition tend to offer a better protection to investors.12 We construct a 
dummy variable capturing whether a country has a British legal origin or not. 
There is considerable evidence from studies on other world regions that there is a positive 
relationship between the ability of the government to pursue policies that promote private-sector 
development and the rule of law on the one hand, and bond market development on the other 
(Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004; Burger and Warnock, 2006).13 We therefore include 
an additional variable, governance, which is a composite indicator based on two indices from the 
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 Key publications championing this ‘legal origin view’ are La Porta et al. (1998) and Beck et al. (2003). For 
evidence for a positive relationship between British legal origin and bond market development, see, for instance, 
Essers et al. (2015). 
13
 See for instance Burger and Warnock (2006) and Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004). 
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Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset (Kaufmann et al., 2014), namely regulatory quality 
and rule of law. Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private-sector 
development. Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The two 
components, regulatory quality and rule of law, have been weighted equally. Higher values of 
the index indicate better governance.  
Finally, we include a variable capturing the openness of political institutions, polity2. There is a 
considerable body of research which argues that countries which have more open political 
institutions are likely to have more developed financial markets.14 Polity2 measures regime types 
on a scale ranging from –0.1 (strongly autocratic) to +0.1 (strongly democratic). Data are taken 
from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2014). 
 
(iv) Caveats 
While our model specifications build on existing studies on bond market development in 
developing and emerging economies, there remain some important methodological concerns. 
The most serious concern is in regard to the limited number of observations due to missing 
values. As Appendix Table A2, which presents the descriptive statistics for our dependent and 
explanatory variables, shows, our sample covers a maximum of 27 SSA countries and a 
maximum of 14 years, but due to missing values (and the use of a 1-year lag of the explanatory 
variables) the analysis that follows extends to no more than 248 observations.15 The limited 
number of observations limits both the power of statistical tests and the degree to which the 
results may be generalisable across SSA.  
In addition, our models, the POLS with PCSE model and the RE model, do not address potential 
reverse causality and endogeneity beyond using lags of the explanatory variables. We would 
have liked to use a modelling approach which gives more weight to dynamics, for instance by 
incorporating a greater number of lags for the explanatory variables, or using an error correction 
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 An excellent overview is provided by Haber et al. (2008). Evidence for a positive relationship between democracy 
and bond market development is provided, for instance, by Claessens et al. (2007) and Essers et al. (2015). 
15
 Our dependent variable, for instance, is available for a maximum of 27 (countries) times 14 (years) minus 120 
(missings), that is 258 observations. 
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model.16 However, as outlined above, the most significant part of variation in our sample is 
cross-country rather than intertemporal variation, rendering the use of more dynamic approaches 
and the estimation of long- and short-term effects difficult.17 That said, we still think that the 
empirical analysis in this article helps to improve our understanding of LCBMs in SSA and 
complements existing studies because it relies on a novel, relatively large dataset with a focus on 
SSA, hence the ability to probe the robustness of the results of existing studies and compare our 
results with those relating to other world regions. 
 
(v) Results 
Figure A1 in the appendix consists of a series of scatterplots, showing correlations between the 
dependent variable, namely the stock of local currency treasury bonds, and the various lagged 
explanatory variables in 2012. Table A3 in the appendix shows the pair-wise correlations 
between stock of local currency treasury bonds, and the various lagged explanatory variables in 
2012. We find: a significant, positive correlation between LCBM development and the natural 
log of GDP; a significant, positive correlation between LCBM development and the natural log 
of GDP per capita, which appears to be driven by Mauritius and South Africa;18 a positive 
correlation between LCBM development and trade openness; a significant, positive correlation 
between LCBM development and private credit by banks; a negative correlation between LCBM 
development and the resource rents in percentage of GDP; a negative correlation between LCBM 
development and past fiscal surpluses; a positive correlation between LCBM development and 
inflation rates, which appears to be driven by Kenya;19 a positive correlation between LCBM 
development and capital account openness; a positive correlation between LCBM development 
and exchange rate volatility; a positive correlation between foreign exchange reserves and 
LCBM development; a positive correlation between LCBM development and British legal 
origin; a significant, positive correlation between LCBM development and the quality of 
governance (the composite index capturing regulatory quality and the rule of law); a significant 
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 We experimented with specifications using contemporaneous values, one lag, and two lags of the explanatory 
variables. Except for the finding that trade openness is only significant in specifications with lagged explanatory 
variables, the results from specifications with these different lag structures are qualitatively similar. 
17
 In many countries LCBM development only gained pace from about 2008 onwards, thus intertemporal variation 
in our sample is only prevalent in a very short time span of 6 years. 
18
 If we exclude Mauritius and South Africa from the sample, the positive correlation loses significance. 
19
 In 2010 and 2011 Kenya, which has deep financial markets, experienced high inflation rates. If we exclude Kenya 
from the sample, the slope of the fitted line is almost flat.  
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positive correlation between LCBM development and the degree to which countries are 
democratic.  
 
(vi) Results of regression models 
Tables 5 and 6 show the estimation results of our regression models. The estimation results of 
the POLS with PCSE are presented in Table 5 and the estimation results of the RE model are 
presented in Table 6. While the estimation results for the two different models differ slightly, 
five variables seem to be quite robustly correlated with LCBM development.  
First, countries with greater economic size, as measured by the natural log of GDP, seem to have 
more developed LCBMs. This result is in line with the findings of other studies such as Mu et al. 
(2013, p. 131), Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), and Claessens et al. (2007).20 
Second, greater openness to trade appears to be associated with deeper LCBMs. Third, more 
developed banking sectors are positively correlated with LCBM development. Other studies, 
such as Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Essers et al. (2015), also present results 
that suggest that there is a significant and positive relationship between the size of the banking 
sector and trade openness on the one hand, and LCBM development on the other. The finding 
that countries with a more developed banking sector tend to be the ones with more developed 
bond markets is in line with the finding that commercial banks have, on balance, remained the 
dominant investor class in LCBMs in SSA (Essers et al., 2015). Fourth, there is a significant and 
negative relationship between foreign exchange reserves and the development of LCBMs. While 
this result appears to be counterintuitive at first, one possible explanation is that large foreign 
exchange reserves tend to be associated with current account surpluses, which means that a 
country is accumulating foreign assets, which may come at the expense of domestic investments 
into LCBMs. Fifth, governance is significantly and positively correlated with LCBM 
development. This finding is in line with the argument that a strong regulatory framework 
promotes financial deepening and with results by others such as Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Essers et al. (2015). In addition, capital account openness is 
positively correlated with LCBM development in most of our specifications, a finding that also 
emerges in the analysis of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), which examines the 
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 The positive and significant relationship between economic size and the development of LCBMs is also the most 
robust result emerging from our additional analyses using FGLS and FE models to examine intertemporal variation. 
The results are presented in the online appendix. 
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determinants of local currency government bond markets in developed and developing countries 
in various world regions. 
As regards the remaining explanatory variables, the evidence of a significant relationship with 
LCBM development is less robust. Specifically, the results from the POLS with PCSE suggests 
that there is a negative relationship between LCBM development and fiscal deficits, but this 
result does not hold for the RE model. Countries with British legal origin appear to have less 
developed LCBMs than others, a finding that contradicts results from other studies such as the 
analysis of LCBMs in SSA by Essers et al. (2015), but has also been found by others, such as 
Eichengreen et al. (2008), who analyse LCBM with a focus on Latin America. There is some 
evidence that countries which are more democratic have more developed LCBMs, although this 
result only holds if we do not control for resource dependence. Finally, in two out of eight 
models there is some evidence that lower stages of economic development are associated with 
deeper LCBMs.21 While this finding is surprising, other studies of the determinants of LCBM 
development, for instance Essers et al. (2015) and Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), 
present similar results. One possible explanation is that governments in richer economies have a 
broader fiscal base which allows them to rely less on LCBM financing.  
Table 7 summarizes the main results of the analyses presented above and provides a comparison 
with the findings of the study of the drivers of LCBM development in SSA by Essers et al. 
(2015) and of three studies which focus on other regions, namely Claessens et al. (2007), who 
examine the drivers of LCBM development in a global sample covering emerging and developed 
economies; Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), who examine the drivers of LCBM 
development using a global sample with a focus on Asia; and Eichengreen et al. (2008), who 
examine the drivers of domestic bond market development in Latin America.22 The picture that 
emerges is that in SSA, as in other world regions, there appear to be benefits for LCBM 
development if countries are larger in economic terms, if they have larger banking systems, if 
they are more open to trade, and if they have better regulatory frameworks and rule of law. In 
our empirical analysis, fiscal deficits are not as consistently negatively associated with local 
currency bond market development as was the case in some previous studies of LCBMs in 
Africa and elsewhere. Likewise, and perhaps surprisingly, macroeconomic stability as measured 
by inflation rates and exchange rate volatility does not come out as a significant factor in our 
                                                           
21
 As the table presented in the online appendix suggests, this finding is also supported by some of our additional 
analyses using feasible GLS and FE estimators. 
22
 Our focus is on the results of the regression models where government bond market development is the dependent 
variable. 
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analyses, while we find larger foreign exchange reserves to have a negative impact on LCBM 
development. 
Table 5: POLS with PCSE 
 Bonds to GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln GDPt–1 0.0132*** 
(0.00180) 
0.0142*** 
(0.00326) 
0.0213*** 
(0.00454) 
0.0417*** 
(0.00592) 
Ln GDP per capitat–1 0.000446 
(0.00595) 
–0.00500 
(0.0117) 
–0.0193 
(0.0123) 
–0.0412** 
(0.0131) 
Trade to GDPt–1 –0.0601+ 
(0.0356) 
0.0465 
(0.0377) 
0.127** 
(0.0432) 
0.175** 
(0.0664) 
Private credit to GDP
 t–1 0.353*** 
(0.0270) 
0.393*** 
(0.0418) 
0.344*** 
(0.0430) 
0.262*** 
(0.0575) 
Fiscal balance to GDPt–1  
 
–0.407*** 
(0.103) 
–0.388*** 
(0.0997) 
–0.316** 
(0.101) 
Inflation ratest–1   
 
0.0589 
(0.0772) 
0.0404 
(0.0735) 
–0.0214 
(0.0918) 
Capital account opennesst–
1 
 
 
0.971*** 
(0.148) 
0.990*** 
(0.150) 
1.280*** 
(0.336) 
Exchange rate volatilityt–1  
 
–0.0652 
(0.0695) 
–0.0874 
(0.0588) 
–0.0773 
(0.0654) 
Foreign exchange reserves 
to GDPt–1 
 
 
–0.127** 
(0.0420) 
–0.147*** 
(0.0363) 
–0.189*** 
(0.0400) 
British legal origin   
 
 
 
–0.0165 
(0.0119) 
–0.0471** 
(0.0177) 
Polity2t–1  
 
 
 
0.194** 
(0.0724) 
–0.121 
(0.187) 
Governancet–1  
 
 
 
0.0390* 
(0.0198) 
0.105*** 
(0.0288) 
Resource rents to GDPt–1  
 
 
 
 
 
–0.0186 
(0.0430) 
Constant –0.303*** 
(0.0462) 
–0.309*** 
(0.0821) 
–0.368*** 
(0.0937) 
–0.614*** 
(0.0944) 
Observations 248 130 130 96 
R2 0.7268 0.8039 0.8198 0.8166 
χ2 p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 6: RE estimator 
  Bonds to GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln GDPt–1  0.0156* 
(0.00614) 
0.0139+ 
(0.00779) 
0.0218* 
(0.0110) 
0.0417*** 
(0.00581) 
Ln GDP per capitat–1  –0.000330 
(0.0100) 
0.00999 
(0.0222) 
–0.00652 
(0.0192) 
–0.0412** 
(0.0138) 
Trade to GDPt–1  –0.0395 
(0.0482) 
0.0526 
(0.0466) 
0.129*** 
(0.0366) 
0.175*** 
(0.0507) 
Private credit to GDP
 t–1  0.355*** 
(0.0673) 
0.307*** 
(0.0728) 
0.215* 
(0.0954) 
0.262** 
(0.0926) 
Fiscal balance to GDPt–1   
 
–0.378 
(0.253) 
–0.399 
(0.261) 
–0.316 
(0.279) 
Inflation ratest–1    
 
–0.0503 
(0.0439) 
–0.0557 
(0.0460) 
–0.0214 
(0.0664) 
Capital account 
opennesst–1 
  
 
0.968* 
(0.385) 
0.698 
(0.604) 
1.280*** 
(0.354) 
Exchange rate volatilityt–
1 
  
 
–0.0668 
(0.0493) 
–0.0844 
(0.0537) 
–0.0773 
(0.0728) 
Foreign exchange 
reserves to GDPt–1 
  
 
–0.135* 
(0.0658) 
–0.142* 
(0.0647) 
–0.189** 
(0.0672) 
British legal origin    
 
 
 
–0.0157 
(0.0213) 
–0.0471* 
(0.0208) 
Polity2t–1   
 
 
 
0.240+ 
(0.124) 
–0.121 
(0.252) 
Governancet–1   
 
 
 
0.0577* 
(0.0292) 
0.105** 
(0.0346) 
Resource rents to GDPt–1   
 
 
 
 
 
–0.0186 
(0.0505) 
Constant  –0.361** 
(0.122) 
–0.376* 
(0.165) 
–0.426+ 
(0.222) 
–0.614*** 
(0.150) 
Observations  248 130 130 96 
R2  0.7246 0.7917 0.8013 0.8166 
χ2 p–value 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 7: Comparison of results 
 This paper Selected other studies 
Model POLS with 
 PCSE RE 
Eichengreen and  
Luengnaruemitchai (2004) Claessens et al. (2007) 
Eichengreen et al. 
(2008) Essers et al. (2015) 
Size of the economy (measured by GDP) + + + + GDP:+; GDP2: – + 
Stage of economic development   – n.a. GDPPC:+; GDPPC2: –  
Trade openness + + + n.a. + + 
Size of the banking sector + + + +  + 
Fiscal balance –  – n.a. – – 
Inflation   n.a. – n.a. – 
Capital account openness +  + n.a. –  
Exchange rate volatility   – n.a. n.a.  
Foreign exchange reserves – – n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
British legal origin   + n.a. – + 
Democracy   n.a. + n.a. + 
Regulatory quality and/or rule of law + + Rule of law: + Bureaucracy quality: – n.a.  + 
Resource dependence   n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Notes:  + = relationship positive and significant; – = relationship negative and significant. As regards results from the analysis presented in this 
paper, we only report a relationship as ‘significant’ in this table where results are significant in all more fully specified models, i.e. in all models 
which include besides other variables the variables relating to the quality of institutions (Polity2, governance, and British legal origin). n.a. = not 
applicable because not included in the analysis. 
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IV. Lessons from emerging markets 
Since the emerging market crises of the late 1990s, many emerging markets have sought to 
develop LCBMs to reduce foreign currency debt and overcome the currency and maturity 
mismatch problems that had previously contributed to financial vulnerability. This strategy 
has been apparently quite successful (Turner, 2012) as markets in Latin America and 
Emerging Asia managed to significantly increase the share of bonds denominated in local 
currency (Table 8). LCBMs provided an important cushion during the Global Financial Crisis 
when US and European financial institutions struggled for survival and would no longer 
extend credit to emerging markets.23 
 
Table 8: Currency denomination in bond markets by broad area 
 2000 2005 2010 2011* 
 Local 
currency 
Foreign 
currency 
Local 
currency 
Foreign 
currency 
Local 
currency 
Foreign 
currency 
Local 
currency 
Foreign 
currency 
Euro area 90.0 10.0 89.9 10.1 89.8 10.2 90.3 9.7 
Japan 98.5 1.5 99.1 0.9 99.4 0.6 99.4 0.6 
Latin 
America 
46.0 54.0 59.9 40.1 71.2 28.8 70.8 29.2 
Emerging 
Asia 
88.4 11.6 91.2 8.8 94.2 5.8 94.3 5.7 
Note: *End September 2011. 
Source: Turner (2012). 
 
Since experiences differ significantly across economies, both emerging and mature, it is 
difficult to pinpoint one single element of reform or practice that will help the emergence of a 
deep and liquid LCBM (Luengnaruemitchai and Ong, 2005). Broadly speaking, the 
experiences of emerging economies in Asia and Latin America confirm the importance of the 
variables that we found to be significant in our empirical analysis of the drivers and obstacles 
to LCBM development in SSA.24 However, it is important to point out that in both Latin 
American and Asian countries successes in LCBM development can be linked to concerted 
policy efforts at the national level, which have been supported by regional and international 
                                                           
23
 As pointed out by Citi Securities and Fund Services (2013, p. 3): ‘The Asian [local currency] corporate bond 
market, which underwent significant changes in the aftermath of 1998 Asia financial crisis, acted as a cushion 
for corporate financing during the global crisis. The markets operated as a balancing-act against fluctuating 
sentiment in global markets as well as slowing banking credit.’ 
24
 Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004, p. 1), for instance, find that ‘[l]arger country size, stronger 
institutions, less volatile exchange rates, and more competitive banking sectors tend to be positively associated 
with bond market capitalization’ while ‘Asian countries’ strong fiscal balances, while admirable on other 
grounds, have not been conducive to the growth of government bond markets’. 
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initiatives. Regional cooperation for LCBM development has been a decisive factor, 
particularly for the laggard markets of East Asia, where in 2002 the ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers launched the ASIAN+3 Bond Market Initiative (ABMI),25 under which a number of 
initiatives were developed aimed at improving the regulatory framework, facilitating bond 
issuance, and broadening the investor base. One example for an ABMI activity is the 
ASEAN+3 Bond Market Forum (ABMF), which was launched as a platform to promote 
standardization of market practices and harmonization of regulations relating to cross-border 
transactions across the region in 2010. Another example of regional cooperation is the Asian 
Bond Fund (ABF) initiative, where a number of central banks invested parts of their reserves 
in the Pan Asia Bond Index Fund as well as eight country-specific index funds. 
Although significant progress has been made, challenges remain in many of these markets, 
including low levels of liquidity, a narrow investor base, and short maturities. A particular 
problem has been the high share of foreign bond holdings in individual LCBMs. In Asia, this 
has at times caused problems in Indonesia and Malaysia, where foreign holdings make up 
more than a third of the local currency government bond market, but also Thailand, where 
foreign holdings account for close to 20 per cent (Figure 7). The latter gives a good 
illustration how a large foreign investor base can be problematic at times: fuelled by 
unconventional monetary policies in the major advanced economies, non-resident net holding 
in the Thai bond market increased very rapidly from Thai baht (THB) 66 billion in December 
2009 to a peak of THB 870 billion in April 2013, the month before Fed Chairman Bernanke’s 
‘tapering’ announcement. In anticipation of rising US interest rates and a (temporary) current 
account deficit at the time, Thailand saw large capital outflows and a depreciation of the THB, 
leading to worries of a repeat of the Thai crisis of 1997. The situation stabilized again 
relatively quickly, but non-resident net holding in the Thai bond market continued to decline 
to THB 640 billion in May 2014. For Thailand, an upper middle-income economy with 
comparably developed financial markets, this episode was challenging but a crisis could be 
avoided. But for low-income economies with shallow financial markets, such as those in SSA, 
even relatively small capital outflows can have a seriously destabilizing effect on the 
exchange rate, financial markets, and the real economy. This is important to highlight at a 
time when several SSA economies have become ‘frontier markets’, experiencing large capital 
inflows, which may reverse again quickly due to domestic or international factors. 
 
                                                           
25ASEAN+3 comprises the 10 member countries of the Association of Asian Nations as well as China, Japan, 
and Korea. 
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Figure 7: Foreign holdings in LCY government bonds (as % of total) 
  
Source: Compiled by authors with data from ADB AsianBondsOnline. 
 
While a greater participation of foreign investors may lower long-term government bond 
yields (Peris, 2010) and increase market liquidity, a high dependency on a foreign investor 
base increases the risk of sudden outflows and spillovers from global markets. As pointed out 
by Azis et al. (2013):  
while the growth of individual bond markets in recent years has been impressive, 
the threat of financial contagion to emerging Asian bond markets from shock and 
volatility spillovers in mature markets is real. Although emerging Asian local 
bond market volatilities are more determined by their own respective shocks and 
volatilities, in some markets the direct shock and volatility spillovers remain 
significant.  
Consequentially, broadening the investor base has been identified as a key challenge in 
further developing market resilience (ADB, 2013). In this context it should be emphasized 
that a high concentration of local sovereign bond holdings in the domestic banking system is 
equally dangerous, because sovereign debt problems can trigger a banking crisis and vice 
versa (as recently seen in Europe). 
Moreover, in order to deal effectively with periods of rapid capital outflows, financial 
authorities need to develop tools for managing the capital account, which may also include the 
temporary re-imposition of capital controls (cf. IMF, 2012). 
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V. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
In this article we discussed the importance of LCBMs as a source of long-term financing for 
development and used a new dataset to investigate the factors that may help or inhibit LCBM 
development in SSA. Our empirical analysis of the relationship between a broad set of 
macroeconomic and institutional variables on the one side and LCBM development on the 
other pointed towards several factors that may be particularly important for LCBM 
development. Notably, we found greater economic size, larger banking sectors, greater 
openness to trade, and better regulatory quality and rule of law to be positively related to 
LCBM development. These findings are broadly in line with those of other studies on bond 
market development in SSA and other world regions. 
A central challenge for developing LCBMs in SSA is to widen the investor base. Our analysis 
suggests that in SSA, countries with a more developed banking sector tend to be the ones with 
more developed LCBMs, which is in tune with the finding that commercial banks have, on 
balance, remained the dominant investor class in LCBMs in SSA. However, the dominance of 
banks among investors in LCBMs is problematic for several reasons. Since banks usually 
prefer a short-term portfolio allocation, it becomes more difficult for the government to issue 
longer maturities, which raises the rollover risk for the government (Bua et al., 2014). 
Moreover, a large exposure of domestic banks to domestic sovereign debt and a heavy 
reliance of governments on financing through domestic banks can cause mutually 
destabilizing effects when either the banks or the sovereign experiences a crisis. 
From these empirical findings and the qualitative findings on the challenges of LCBM 
development in SSA we derive several policy recommendations.26 To overcome the problems 
associated with small economic size and small banking systems—including illiquid debt 
instruments, short maturities, a restricted and undifferentiated investor base, and undeveloped 
secondary markets—regional bond market development initiatives such as those initiated in 
Asia should be promoted in SSA, including initiatives for harmonizing legal and regulatory 
frameworks and for facilitating the cross-listing of bonds on several national exchanges.  
To promote LCBM development, authorities in SSA should also address institutional and 
legal deficiencies to ensure the enforcement of laws and enhance the safety of the investment 
environment. This may include ensuring and alleviating profit repatriation, lowering payment 
delays, and guaranteeing contract viability. To overcome problems impeding the issuance of 
                                                           
26
 Some of these policy recommendations comply with those proposed by Adegelan and Radzweicz-Bak, (2009) 
and IMF et al. (2013). 
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domestic debt it is important to establish an adequate infrastructure including the institutional 
structure and a solid legal framework. For better monitoring of domestic sovereign debt an 
appropriate debt management strategy needs to be put in place. It is also important to train 
personnel in the field of debt management adequately because these skills are needed for 
issuing domestic securities. 
In the area of debt management, donors can be helpful in providing technical assistance. 
Programmes and initiatives like the World Bank’s and the IMF’s Debt Management Facility 
for Low-Income Countries and the Debt Management and Financial Analysis System of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provide country-specific 
technical assistance at different levels that broadly covers low-income countries.27 While 
donors can support the governments of low-income countries in defining and sequencing 
reforms, countries must institute the reforms themselves (Berensmann, 2015). Clearly, the 
sequencing and intensity of these policy measures will depend on the stage of the LCBM 
development as well as on the role that is envisaged for LCBMs in the respective countries. 
As pointed out, foreign investor participation broadens the investor base and can give a boost 
to market development, yet it may also increase volatility of international capital flows. 
Hence, capital market liberalization should be pursued only very cautiously and in pace with 
solid financial and institutional development. 
Despite the various challenges for LCBM development in SSA and associated risks, they can 
become an important source for providing long- or medium-term capital not only for 
governments but also for companies. Although the development of local currency sovereign 
debt markets may theoretically divert investment away from private entrepreneurial activity, 
the emergence of a liquid yield curve for government securities is a crucial precondition for 
the development of an efficient corporate bond market. By releasing long-term funds for 
much-needed public infrastructure financing as well as facilitating corporate investment, the 
development of sovereign and corporate debt markets can make important contributions to 
sustainable development in SSA. 
 
                                                           
27
 A similar initiative is the World Bank Group’s Global Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond Program 
(Gemloc), which supports LCBM development in emerging market countries (EMCs) (World Bank and IFC, 
2015). One main drawback of this programme is that it focuses on EMCs rather than on low-income countries. 
For this reason only three SSA countries have been supported by this initiative: South Africa, Nigeria, and 
Kenya. 
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Figure A1: Bivariate scatter plots: local currency treasury bonds outstanding (% of GDP) versus lagged explanatory variables* 
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Table A1: Maximum coverage of the empirical analysis in selected studies  
Authors Maximum 
coverage Maximum coverage of African countries 
Type of public debt focused on in the 
study 
This study 
28 countries in 
SSA in the period 
2000–13 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia 
Medium- and long-term (maturity of 1 
year or more) sovereign bonds in local 
currency outstanding  
Essers et al. (2015) 
15 countries in 
SSA in the period 
2003–12 
Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
Year-end outstanding marketable central 
government debt in or indexed to local 
currency  
Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai 
(2004) 
41countries in the 
period 1990–2001 South Africa 
Domestic currency bonds issued by 
residents (public and private sector) and 
targeted to local investors 
Claessens et al. 
(2007) 
35 countries in the 
period 1993–2000 South Africa 
Amounts outstanding of bonds 
(including long-term bonds, notes, 
Treasury bills, and money-market 
instruments) issued by the public sector 
(including all government levels and 
state agencies) denominated in their 
own local currency at year-end values.  
Bua et al. (2014) 
40 low-income and 
lower middle-
income countries in 
the period 1971–
2011 
Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Domestic debt, defined as central 
government debt owed to creditor 
resident in the same country and 
including all domestic financial 
liabilities defined by the Government 
Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 
prepared by the IMF, with the exception 
of arrears 
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Table A2: Summary statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations 
Bonds to GDP  overall 0.0678612 0.0854706 0.0002635 0.4034257 N =     258 
 
between 0.0703779 0.0017202 0.3145468 n =      27 
 
within 0.043405 –0.1026752 0.2420337 T–bar = 9.55556 
Ln GDP overall 22.74007 1.317338 20.10349 26.47096 N =     378 
 
between 1.323225 20.31373 26.27761 n =      27 
 
within 0.2117363 22.06755 23.26822 T =      14 
Ln GDP per capita overall 6.768702 1.067898 4.968309 8.857665 N =     378 
 
between 1.079125 5.007828 8.760619 n =      27 
 
within 0.1266918 6.316537 7.099713 T =      14 
Trade overall 0.3557558 0.1754738 0.046858 1.00949 N =     361 
 
between 0.1695913 0.0736737 0.7633042 n =      27 
 
within 0.0587294 0.1225172 0.6019416 T = 13.3704 
Banking sector size overall 0.2220144 0.1854089 0.0196654 1.080503 N =     378 
 
between 0.1794533 0.0868521 0.7837554 n =      27 
 
within 0.0573012 0.0132333 0.5187615 T =      14 
Fiscal balance overall 
–0.0100656 0.0458332 –0.0936402 0.1834381 N =     159 
 
between 0.0438476 –0.0716354 0.1253809 n =      22 
 
within 0.0298069 –0.0889879 0.1041374 T = 7.22727 
Inflation overall 0.0874503 0.2034669 –0.0961615 3.249969 N =     375 
 
between 0.1121489 0.0183392 0.6071064 n =      27 
 
within 0.1707737 –0.4318952 2.730313 T–bar = 13.8889 
Capital account openness overall 
–0.0047722 0.013946 –0.0187502 0.0242176 N =     351 
 
between 0.0140729 –0.0155195 0.0242176 n =      27 
 
within 0.0017991 –0.0131798 0.0000789 T =      13 
Foreign exchange reserves overall 0.1688919 0.1511864 0.0020303 1.080826 N =     375 
 
between 0.1416778 0.0641933 0.7512179 n =      27 
 
within 0.0579534 –0.0720679 0.4985004 T = 13.8889 
Exchange rate volatility overall 0.103902 0.0955271 0.015805 0.7051712 N =     376 
 
between 0.0563919 0.0397266 0.299652 n =      27 
 
within 0.0777491 –0.1388834 0.5744183 T–bar = 13.9259 
British legal origin overall 0.4814815 0.5003192 0 1 N =     378 
 
between 0.5091751 0 1 n =      27 
 
within 0 0.4814815 0.4814815 T =      14 
Polity2 overall 0.0324339 0.0519018 –0.09 0.1 N =     378 
 
between 0.0508566 –0.09 0.1 n =      27 
 
within 0.014021 –0.0518519 0.0774339 T =      14 
Governance overall 
–0.4074306 0.5136713 –1.729445 0.9593425 N =     324 
 
between 0.5127069 –1.299843 0.8097342 n =      27 
 
within 0.0997096 –0.8370332 –0.1061795 T =      12 
Resource rents overall 0.1125491 0.170617 0 0.7112091 N =     208 
 
between 0.1686194 0.0000455 0.5377197 n =      16 
 
within 0.0482278 –0.0414955 0.2860384 T =      13 
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Table A3: Pair-wise correlations for the year 2012 
Bond GDP 
Ln GDPt–1 0.3431* 
(0.0798) 
Ln GDP per capitat–1 0.4874* 
(0.0099) 
Trade to GDPt–1 0.1277 
(0.5255) 
Private credit to GDPt–1 0.8520* 
(0.0000) 
Resource rents to GDPt–1 –0.3288 
(0.2137) 
Fiscal balance to GDPt–1 –0.2546 
(0.3079) 
Inflation ratest–1 0.1245 
(0.5363) 
Capital account opennesst–1 0.2094 
(0.2945) 
Exchange rate volatilityt–1  
(0.5289) 
Foreign exchange reserves to GDPt–1 0.0339 
(0.8668) 
British legal origin 0.1034 
(0.6078) 
Governancet–1 0.6146* 
(0.0006) 
Polity2t–1 0.4704* 
(0.0133) 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. *p< 0.10. 
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Online Appendix Table 1: Patterns of LCBM development: Feasible GLS, Fixed Effects, and AR1 error model 
 Bonds to GDP 
 FGLS FE AR1 error model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Ln GDPt–1 0.0142*** 
(0.00202) 
0.0164*** 
(0.00281) 
0.0177** 
(0.00630) 
0.0317*** 
(0.00669) 
–0.239 
(0.273) 
0.501 
(0.312) 
0.476 
(0.314) 
1.133* 
(0.400) 
0.107** 
(0.0396) 
0.401*** 
(0.0824) 
0.376*** 
(0.0776) 
0.582*** 
(0.108) 
Ln GDP per capitat–1 –0.00425+ 
(0.00256) 
–0.0117 
(0.00729) 
0.00960 
(0.0117) 
–0.0261** 
(0.00882) 
0.229 
(0.289) 
–0.735+ 
(0.424) 
–0.705 
(0.424) 
–1.430* 
(0.546) 
–0.0546 
(0.0574) 
–0.527*** 
(0.140) 
–0.507*** 
(0.132) 
–0.796*** 
(0.169) 
Trade to GDPt–1 –0.0113 
(0.0146) 
0.0487+ 
(0.0284) 
0.110*** 
(0.0270) 
0.105** 
(0.0382) 
–0.0637 
(0.0657) 
0.0556 
(0.0707) 
0.0653 
(0.0675) 
0.179+ 
(0.0966) 
–0.0219 
(0.0387) 
0.0363 
(0.0473) 
0.0487 
(0.0468) 
0.0477 
(0.0708) 
Private credit to GDPt–1 0.239*** 
(0.0221) 
0.399*** 
(0.0182) 
0.159*** 
(0.0309) 
0.159*** 
(0.0387) 
0.165 
(0.160) 
–0.0800 
(0.147) 
–0.0839 
(0.148) 
–0.137 
(0.176) 
0.166* 
(0.0717) 
–0.0244 
(0.0592) 
–0.0304 
(0.0568) 
–0.119 
(0.0807) 
Fiscal balance to GDPt–1  
 
–0.113* 
(0.0511) 
–0.168** 
(0.0545) 
–0.0978 
(0.0634) 
 
 
–0.264 
(0.190) 
–0.305+ 
(0.174) 
–0.349 
(0.224) 
 
 
–0.0918 
(0.0937) 
–0.129 
(0.0858) 
–0.109 
(0.0806) 
Inflation ratest–1   
 
–0.0305 
(0.0275) 
–0.0174 
(0.0267) 
–0.0175 
(0.0346) 
 
 
–0.202* 
(0.0741) 
–0.187* 
(0.0746) 
–0.186+ 
(0.103) 
 
 
–0.0540 
(0.0525) 
–0.0413 
(0.0518) 
–0.0392 
(0.0584) 
Capital account 
opennesst–1 
 
 
1.092*** 
(0.149) 
0.464+ 
(0.267) 
0.557 
(0.363) 
 
 
–5.040 
(6.767) 
–5.230 
(6.423) 
–3.613 
(6.787) 
 
 
–1.057 
(2.328) 
–1.272 
(2.294) 
–3.473 
(2.889) 
Exchange rate volatilityt–1  
 
–0.0465 
(0.0413) 
–0.126*** 
(0.0361) 
–0.0892* 
(0.0358) 
 
 
–0.0363 
(0.133) 
–0.0446 
(0.141) 
–0.148 
(0.129) 
 
 
–0.0696 
(0.0718) 
–0.0669 
(0.0700) 
–0.0576 
(0.0716) 
Foreign exchange 
reserves to GDPt–1 
 
 
–0.0876** 
(0.0308) 
–0.0847** 
(0.0317) 
–0.151*** 
(0.0388) 
 
 
–0.0355 
(0.0759) 
–0.0390 
(0.0778) 
–0.0762 
(0.0760) 
 
 
–0.0317 
(0.0436) 
–0.0327 
(0.0422) 
–0.00942 
(0.0461) 
British legal origin   
 
 
 
–0.0168 
(0.0142) 
–0.0427* 
(0.0193) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polity2t–1  
 
 
 
0.0214 
(0.0779) 
0.0278 
(0.103) 
 
 
 
 
0.384 
(0.396) 
–0.170 
(0.935) 
 
 
 
 
0.327* 
(0.155) 
–0.0281 
(0.350) 
Governancet–1  
 
 
 
0.0958*** 
(0.0123) 
0.101*** 
(0.0207) 
 
 
 
 
0.0322 
(0.0743) 
–0.0277 
(0.0869) 
 
 
 
 
0.0627 
(0.0416) 
0.0518 
(0.0519) 
Resource rents to GDPt–1  
 
 
 
 
 
–0.000474 
(0.0333) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0228 
(0.141) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0406 
(0.0647) 
Constant –0.298*** 
(0.0482) 
–0.312*** 
(0.0515) 
–0.394*** 
(0.0952) 
–0.453*** 
(0.117) 
3.885 
(4.313) 
–6.532 
(4.470) 
–6.137 
(4.536) 
–16.62* 
(5.822) 
–2.173*** 
(0.585) 
–5.709*** 
(1.019) 
–5.181*** 
(0.980) 
–8.064*** 
(1.466) 
Observations 248 128 128 95 248 130 130 96 248 130 130 96 
R2         0.7287 0.8654 0.8677 0.8498 
χ2 p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  . . . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Country FE 
    
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE 
    
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
